The object of this essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to someone else. The only part of the conduct for which he is amenable to society is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.[1]
***
What, then, is the rightful limit to the
sovereignty of the individual over himself?
Where does the authority of society begin? How much of human life should be assigned to
individuality, and how much to society?
Each will receive its proper share if each has
that which more particularly concerns it.
To individuality should belong the part of life in which it is chiefly
the individual that is interested; to society, the part which chiefly interest society.
Though society is not founded on a contract,
and though no good purpose is answered by inventing a contract in order to
deduce social obligations from it, everyone who receives the protection of
society owes a return for the benefit, and the fact of living in society
renders it indispensable that each should be bound to observe a certain line of
conduct towards the rest. This conduct
consists, first, in not injuring the interests of one another, or rather
certain interests which, either by express legal provision or by tacit
understanding, ought to be considered as rights; and secondly, in each person’s
bearing his share (to be fixed on some equitable principle) of the labours and
sacrifices incurred for defending the society or its members from injury or
molestation. These conditions society is
justified in enforcing at all costs to those who endeavor to withhold fulfillment. Nor is this all that society may do. The acts of an individual may be hurtful to others
or wanting in due consideration for their welfare, without going to the length of
violating their constitutional rights.
The offender may be justly punished by opinion, though not by law. As soon as any part of a person’s conduct
affects prejudicially the interests of others, society has jurisdiction over it,
and the question whether the general welfare will or will not be promoted by
interfering with it becomes open to discussion.
But there is no room for entertaining any such question when a person’s
conduct affects the interests of no person besides himself, or needs not affect
them unless they like (all the persons concerned being of full age and the
ordinary amount of understanding). In
all such cases, there should be perfect freedom, legal and social, to do the
action and stand the consequences.[2]
***
Whenever, in short, there is definite damage,
or definite risk of damage, either to an individual or to the public, the case
is taken out of the province of liberty and placed in that of morality or law.[3]
John Stuart
Mill, On Liberty (1859)
No comments:
Post a Comment