On the importance of examining your own tenets: John Locke

21. Contrary Principles in the World.

I easily grant that there are great numbers of opinions which, by men of different countries, educations, and tempers, are received and embraced as first and unquestionable principles; many whereof, both for their absurdity as well as oppositions to one another, it is impossible should be true. But yet all those propositions, how remote soever from reason are so sacred somewhere or other, that men even of good understanding in other matters, will sooner part with their lives, and whatever is dearest to them, than suffer themselves to doubt, or others to question, the truth of them.

22. How men commonly come by their Principles.

This, however strange it may seem, is that which every day’s experience confirms; and will not, perhaps, appear so wonderful, if we consider the ways and steps by which it is brought about; and how really it may come to pass, that doctrines that have been derived from no better original than the superstition of a nurse, or the authority of an old woman, may, by length of time and consent of neighbours, grow up to the dignity of PRINCIPLES in religion or morality. For such, who are careful (as they call it) to principle children well, (and few there be who have not a set of those principles for them, which they believe in,) instil into the unwary, and as yet unprejudiced, understanding, (for white paper receives any characters,) those doctrines they would have them retain and profess. These being taught them as soon as they have any apprehension; and still as they grow up confirmed to them, either by the open profession or tacit consent of all they have to do with; or at least by those of whose wisdom, knowledge, and piety they have an opinion, who never suffer those propositions to be otherwise mentioned but as the basis and foundation on which they build their religion and manners, come, by these means, to have the reputation of unquestionable, self-evident, and innate truths.

23. Principles supposed innate because we do not remember when we began to hold them.

To which we may add, that when men so instructed are grown up, and reflect on their own minds, they cannot find anything more ancient there than those opinions, which were taught them before their memory began to keep a register of their actions, or date the time when any new thing appeared to them; and therefore make no scruple to conclude, that those propositions of whose knowledge they can find in themselves no original, were certainly the impress of God and nature upon their minds, and not taught them by any one else. These they entertain and submit to, as many do to their parents with veneration; not because it is natural: nor do children do it where they are not so taught; but because, having been always so educated, and having no remembrance of the beginning of this respect, they think it is natural.

24. How such principles come to be held.

This will appear very likely, and almost unavoidable to come to pass, if we consider the nature of mankind and the constitution of human affairs; wherein most men cannot live without employing their time in the daily labours of their callings; nor be at quiet in their minds without SOME foundation or principle to rest their thoughts on. There is scarcely any one so floating and superficial in his understanding, who hath not some reverenced propositions, which are to him the principles on which he bottoms his reasonings, and by which he judgeth of truth and falsehood, right and wrong; which some, wanting skill and leisure, and others the inclination, and some being taught that they ought not to examine, there are few to be found who are not exposed by their ignorance, laziness, education, or precipitancy, to TAKE THEM UPON TRUST.

25. Further explained.

This is evidently the case of all children and young folk; and custom, a greater power than nature, seldom failing to make them worship for divine what she hath inured them to bow their minds and submit their understandings to, it is no wonder that grown men, either perplexed in the necessary affairs of life, or hot in the pursuit of pleasures, should not seriously sit down to examine their own tenets; especially when one of their principles is, that principles ought not to be questioned. And had men leisure, parts, and will, who is there almost that dare shake the foundations of all his past thoughts and actions, and endure to bring upon himself the shame of having been a long time wholly in mistake and error? Who is there hardy enough to contend with the reproach which is everywhere prepared for those who dare venture to dissent from the received opinions of their country or party? And where is the man to be found that can patiently prepare himself to bear the name of whimsical, sceptical, or atheist; which he is sure to meet with, who does in the least scruple any of the common opinions? And he will be much more afraid to question those principles, when he shall think them, as most men do, the standards set up by God in his mind, to be the rule and touchstone of all other opinions. And what can hinder him from thinking them sacred, when he finds them the earliest of all his own thoughts, and the most reverenced by others?

26. A worship of idols.

It is easy to imagine how, by these means, it comes to pass that men worship the idols that have been set up in their minds; grow fond of the notions they have been long acquainted with there; and stamp the characters of divinity upon absurdities and errors; become zealous votaries to bulls and monkeys, and contend too, fight, and die in defence of their opinions. Dum solos credit habendos esse deos, quos ipse colit. For, since the reasoning faculties of the soul, which are almost constantly, though not always warily nor wisely employed, would not know how to move, for want of a foundation and footing, in most men, who through laziness or avocation do not, or for want of time, or true helps, or for other causes, cannot penetrate into the principles of knowledge, and trace truth to its fountain and original, it is natural for them, and almost unavoidable, to take up with some borrowed principles; which being reputed and presumed to be the evident proofs of other things, are thought not to need any other proof themselves. Whoever shall receive any of these into his mind, and entertain them there with the reverence usually paid to principles, never venturing to examine them, but accustoming himself to believe them, because they are to be believed, may take up, from his education and the fashions of his country, any absurdity for innate principles; and by long poring on the same objects, so dim his sight as to take monsters lodged in his own brain for the images of the Deity, and the workmanship of his hands.

27. Principles must be examined.

By this progress, how many there are who arrive at principles which they believe innate may be easily observed, in the variety of opposite principles held and contended for by all sorts and degrees of men. And he that shall deny this to be the method wherein most men proceed to the assurance they have of the truth and evidence of their principles, will perhaps find it a hard matter any other way to account for the contrary tenets, which are firmly believed, confidently asserted, and which great numbers are ready at any time to seal with their blood. And, indeed, if it be the privilege of innate principles to be received upon their own authority, without examination, I know not what may not be believed, or how any one’s principles can be questioned. If they may and ought to be examined and tried, I desire to know how first and innate principles can be tried; or at least it is reasonable to demand the MARKS and CHARACTERS whereby the genuine innate principles may be distinguished from others: that so, amidst the great variety of pretenders, I may be kept from mistakes in so material a point as this. When this is done, I shall be ready to embrace such welcome and useful propositions; and till then I may with modesty doubt; since I fear universal consent, which is the only one produced, will scarcely prove a sufficient mark to direct my choice, and assure me of any innate principles.

From what has been said, I think it past doubt, that there are no practical principles wherein all men agree; and therefore none innate.[1]

Source: John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1789)

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[1] John Locke, An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding.  In Four Books. (London: 1790), Book I, Chapter III [Project Gutenberg e-book].

Why Remembrance Day is on November 11: First Look to ‘The Iliad’ by Homer

Thanks to Christopher Nolan’s latest blockbuster, The Odyssey, there has been a resurgence of interest in things ancient, Greek, and classical.  In part, this represents a longing for historical knowledge and a desire to contextualize our rapid fire - and rather uncertain - times into a greater narrative of events: such an imagined past might give us meaning, or perspective. 

At the same time, it is in itself suggestive of a pre-Socratic shift in contemporary culture and thinking.  We are less interested in the reflections of Socrates, or his student, Plato, or his student, Aristotle.  Plato, for instance, is less central today, because his idea of politics (as found in The Republic) resembles a form of basic communism, deflowered by the Russian, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in The Gulag Archipelago (tr. 1974).  For some, Plato may still offer a valuable critique of democracy, as learned from the death of Socrates at the hands of the demos, or people of Athens.  Aristotle, too, is less fashionable today, owing to his preoccupation with the idea of moderation, the kind of thing in which Canadians alone seem to indulge.

Instead, we have turned  from the classic Greek philosophers to the philosophy of “the flux” as represented by Heraclitus, who stated famously, “The river where you set your foot just now is gone – those waters giving way to this, now this”.[1]  Heraclitus is also remembered for “All things change” and “War is the father of all things”.[2]  Certainly, these thoughts may resonate with the public today, even though they are associated with - if not also espoused by - far Right figures and followers of the German philosopher Heidegger, for example, a known Nazi.

Thus, Homer’s Iliad and The Odyssey – both -  fit within today’s prevailing cultural, pre-Socratic paradigm:  The Trojan War and Odysseus’s 10-year journey back to Ithaca from that war are evocative of a mentality that is less ‘reasonable’ and more ‘epic’, ‘tragic’, and even ‘fantastic’ (if we are to consider, as well, the gods of Olympus ruling over mere mortals).

The role of ‘irrational’ thought to the pre-Socratic mind, however, is not unique to today.  A similar wave of pre-Socratic thought swept Europe in the decades before the First World War (1914-1918), notably represented by the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche and his French counterpart, Henri Bergson.  Nietzsche, who liked to ‘philosophize with a hammer’, wanted to celebrate Homer and despised Socrates for succumbing to a ‘herd’ mentality.  Bergson spoke of ‘intuition’ and ‘creative becoming’, notions which animated French soldiers as they marched off to their deaths in blazing red trousers in the early days of war.

It is also important to realize that, prior to the First World War, Europe had a shared culture in its Greek and Roman heritage, particularly among the educated elite and aristocracy.  This aristocracy came to lose its political hold after the levelling effects of the Great War: following ‘mass’ mobilization and death, the Soviet end to Tsarism in Russia, the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Ottoman Empire, and the abdication of the German Emperor Kaiser Willhelm II.

Today, we have, in effect, almost forgotten how important knowledge and an understanding of the classics was to higher society before the First World War.  In a learned study, The Greek Heritage in Victorian Britain (1981), Frank M. Turner remarks: “Indeed, in 1865 the major commentator on Homer as well as a major translator of the poet, the chief critic and historian of Greek literature, the most significant political historians of Greece, and the authors of the then most extensive commentaries on Greek philosophy either were or had been members of the House of Lords or the House of Commons.”[3]

Just about everybody knows that the First World War Armistice was announced on the 11^th hour of the 11^th day of the 11^th month: November 11, 1918.  But why the 11^th?  Was this just a matter of convenient symmetry?  In my view, there is far more than what meets the eye here.  What I am suggesting is that the 11^th is impossible to understand without a knowledge of The Iliad and without an appreciation for the significance of the number 12 in Western culture.

The Iliad is filled with references to the number 12.  And, indeed, there are 12 Greek gods, as well as 12 Norse gods.  There are 12 hours of the day, and 12 hours of the night; 12 months in a year; Jesus had 12 disciples; and, of course, a “ruler” (in my day) had 12 inches.  In other words, the number 12 was at the numerical “base” of Western culture after which the cycle of 12 is thought to be repeated.

Looking closely at the last chapter in The Iliad (chapter 24!) we see that Achilles, in the battle for Troy, has taken revenge for the death of his friend Patroclus and killed Hector.  Hector’s father, Priam, ruler of Troy, grieves for his son and wants the return of his body.  Following the intervention of Zeus, Priam offers a huge ransom for his son.  Priam then makes his way to Achilles’s camp in secret - and together they both weep, as Achilles, too, thinks of his own father.  Priam then asks that he and his fellow Trojans be allowed to mourn Hector for 11 days: “On the 12^th we will fight, if we really have to”.[4]  Achilles agrees to this.

Thus, as the First World War ground itself to a halt and as Empires began to crumble, the number 11 – as inspired by The Iliad – was inevitably considered by leading politicians and other important figures as an appropriate occasion for mourning: hence the Armistice on November 11.  There are other parallels between the First World War and The Iliad: notably a long trench (built by the Greeks to defend themselves from the Trojans) and the poppy, symbolic of a man’s head weighed down by death.  Most of this has been forgotten today, as we are no longer schooled in the ancient Greek language as was the aristocracy in 19^th century Europe.

We can carry the argument even further by looking ahead to the timing of the Paris Peace Conference which began, interestingly, on Saturday, January 18, 1919, so promoting ‘continuity’ between the Armistice and a subsequent Peace.  Accordingly, historical dates are not all random happenings, and certainly not the Armistice of November 11, 1918.

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[1] Heraclitus, Fragments, tr. Brooks Haxton (Toronto : Penguin, 2003), p. 27

[2] Ibid., p. 25.

[3] Frank M. Turner, The Greek Heritage in Victorian Britain (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), p. 5.

[4] Homer, The Iliad, tr. E.V. Rieu, revised by Peter Jones and D.C.H. Rieu (London : Penguin: 2003), p. 438.

St. Upid

 
      h/t Being Liberal

Whigs & Tories – and Trump’s Air Force One decoy

Elsewhere I have indicated that Trump has been busy overturning the Lockean tradition in America.  So, Trump, in other words, is no Whig, or liberal.  But let’s not mistake him for a Tory, either.

The key Whig virtue is “keeping one’s word” or “trust” which is the building block of a predictable commercial society, where there are contractual forms of interdependence.[1]  We find the beginnings of this in the Scottish Enlightenment and in the eighteenth-century Age of Enlightenment generally.  Whig virtue is an expression of rational, constitutional freedom, along with notions of a principled and accountable public life.  Hence: public honesty.  The concept of a National Debt was, consequently, a Whig invention; it was intended to help with obligations to those in despair.

The key Tory virtue, on the other hand, is “loyalty”, one based on landed wealth, for which the idea of a National Debt came to be considered an unbearable burden.  Hereditary rights and hierarchical order are therefore preeminent.  So too is the authority of the patriarch, the central pillar behind Sir Robert Filmer, who, writing in Patriarcha (1680), defended the book of Genesis, the lineage of those descended from Adam, and the importance of an absolute monarchy accountable to no person.

The struggle between Whigs and Tories in America is mirrored in divisions between the North and South, and the American Civil War, which explains why Trump relocated from New York City to his Mar-a-Lago estate in Florida.  It’s a struggle between rational freedom and personal loyalty, or at least it was.

Here’s the kicker: while Trump certainly does not engender Whig “trust”, he can no longer command Tory “loyalty”.  Trump’s Air Force One scandal, when he secretly switched planes to avoid an apparent threat by vengeful Iranians – only to leave in the decoy plane members of his own  Cabinet (Marco Rubio and Scott Bessent) as well as members of the media  - can only introduce doubt among the indoctrinated.  This story became public on 10 August.  This is quite possibly why White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt announced her resignation two days following, on 12 August. 

It also reminds us of Trump’s attitude towards his own former Vice President, Mike Pence, at the time of the January insurrection against Congress  in 2021.  Mike Pence was expendable then.  So, too, are Rubio and Bessent today.  One can only speculate as to why these two men in particular could be sacrificed while Pete Hegseth, apparently, travelled along with Trump.

Anglo-Saxon Tory “loyalty” was sometimes considered on a par with Asiatic cultures – notably India and China, each with a recognizable tradition of hierarchy and patriarchy.[2]  I suspect, however, that there is a difference in terms of degree.   Trump has pushed the boundaries of Anglo-Saxon “loyalty” with his Air Force One decoy.  He has instead clearly entered the realm of despotism, the main element of which is “fear”.

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[1] See John W. Burrow, “Henry Maine and mid-Victorian ideas of progress” in Alan Diamond, The Victorian Achievement of Sir Henry Maine: A Centennial Reappraisal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 57.  See also John W. Burrow, A Liberal Descent: Victorian Historians and the English Past (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 77.

[2] John W. Burrow in The Victorian Achievements of Sir Henry Maine, p. 57.

Canada’s problem with the ‘equality of feeling’ as found in the CBC

Turn on any English language CBC programme as it churns out the breathless news of the day, and you will hear the same fundamental question: ‘how do you feel about such and such event?’ – not: ‘what do you think?’  The difference is telling, and it is evident our public broadcaster is still afflicted by aspects of Trudeau-era Romanticism.  Here, for the benefit of the reader, is a succinct analysis of the hidden assumptions – and shortcomings - behind the idea that everyone is equal in feeling:

The phrase equal feeling is at the root of the matter.  Man is by nature good.  He is by nature the equal of his fellow men; that is to say, equality of men is really an equality of goodness.  Now men have come to differ obviously in outward circumstances, in wealth and power.  That in which they still preserve a rough sort of equality is feeling.  Our desires are surely more nearly common than anything else about us.  If then we assume that feeling, instinct, desire, are in themselves good, we have brought equality into the practical world.  We have gained a powerful means of persuading people that inequality is not in the nature of man.  We have put inequality, and the whole problem of evil, into the accident of things; that is, into our environment.  A little freewill can work wonders with environment.  We have solved the problem of evil, and with that one assumption – that man’s feelings are naturally good.  That men have similar feelings observation shows.  Therefore men have similar goodness.  Hence something unnatural, something foreign to man’s real self, has produced badness and inequality among men.[1]

 

 

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[1] Crane Brinton, The Political Ideas of the English Romanticists (London: Oxford University Press, 1926), p. 25.

President or King? A look at Federalist No. 69

In the Federalist Papers, the framers of the U.S. constitution specifically sought to dispel fears the American presidency was comparable with the British king: The equivalency, in their eyes, was considered  false.  The following excerpts illustrate the argument that the powers of presidency could not exceed that of the governor of New York, for example.  Readers, however, should also keep in mind that the authority associated with the British monarchy has diminished (partly in response to American Independence and the French Revolution) since the signing of  the American Constitution in 1787.

That magistrate is to be elected for FOUR years; and is to be re-eligible as often as the people of the United States shall think him worthy of their confidence. In these circumstances there is a total dissimilitude between HIM and a king of Great Britain, who is an HEREDITARY monarch, possessing the crown as a patrimony descendible to his heirs forever; but there is a close analogy between HIM and a governor of New York, who is elected for THREE years, and is re-eligible without limitation or intermission. If we consider how much less time would be requisite for establishing a dangerous influence in a single State, than for establishing a like influence throughout the United States, we must conclude that a duration of FOUR years for the Chief Magistrate of the Union is a degree of permanency far less to be dreaded in that office, than a duration of THREE years for a corresponding office in a single State.

The President of the United States would be liable to be impeached, tried, and, upon conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors, removed from office; and would afterwards be liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law. The person of the king of Great Britain is sacred and inviolable; there is no constitutional tribunal to which he is amenable; no punishment to which he can be subjected without involving the crisis of a national revolution. In this delicate and important circumstance of personal responsibility, the President of Confederated America would stand upon no better ground than a governor of New York, and upon worse ground than the governors of Maryland and Delaware.

…

Hence it appears that, except as to the concurrent authority of the President in the article of treaties, it would be difficult to determine whether that magistrate would, in the aggregate, possess more or less power than the Governor of New York. And it appears yet more unequivocally, that there is no pretense for the parallel which has been attempted between him and the king of Great Britain. But to render the contrast in this respect still more striking, it may be of use to throw the principal circumstances of dissimilitude into a closer group.

The President of the United States would be an officer elected by the people for FOUR years; the king of Great Britain is a perpetual and HEREDITARY prince. The one would be amenable to personal punishment and disgrace; the person of the other is sacred and inviolable. The one would have a QUALIFIED negative upon the acts of the legislative body; the other has an ABSOLUTE negative. The one would have a right to command the military and naval forces of the nation; the other, in addition to this right, possesses that of DECLARING war, and of RAISING and REGULATING fleets and armies by his own authority. The one would have a concurrent power with a branch of the legislature in the formation of treaties; the other is the SOLE POSSESSOR of the power of making treaties. The one would have a like concurrent authority in appointing to offices; the other is the sole author of all appointments. The one can confer no privileges whatever; the other can make denizens of aliens, noblemen of commoners; can erect corporations with all the rights incident to corporate bodies. The one can prescribe no rules concerning the commerce or currency of the nation; the other is in several respects the arbiter of commerce, and in this capacity can establish markets and fairs, can regulate weights and measures, can lay embargoes for a limited time, can coin money, can authorize or prohibit the circulation of foreign coin. The one has no particle of spiritual jurisdiction; the other is the supreme head and governor of the national church! What answer shall we give to those who would persuade us that things so unlike resemble each other? The same that ought to be given to those who tell us that a government, the whole power of which would be in the hands of the elective and periodical servants of the people, is an aristocracy, a monarchy, and a despotism

 

Source: Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist Papers: No. 69 “The Real Character of the Executive”, Friday March 14, 1788.  Yale Avalon Project, online.

Tim Cook's 'Lifesavers and Body Snatchers' - A Review by George Eliot

Tim Cook, Canada’s most prolific war historian, and I both did our undergraduate studies in History at Trent University in Peterborough, Ontario, Canada.  I was interested in reviewing his book Lifesavers and Body Snatchers: Medical Care and the Struggle for Survival in the Great War (Penguin, 2022).  Unfortunately, he was overtaken by death in the meantime at age 54.  So, I chose otherwise.  Here, from my readings of George Eliot’s Middlemarch (1872), is, in my view, the most conceivably light-footed manner for replying to Cook’s work:

“I am thinking of a great fellow, who was about as old as I am three hundred years ago, and had already begun a new era in anatomy.”

“I can’t guess,” said Rosamond, shaking her head. “We used to play at guessing historical characters at Mrs. Lemon’s, but not anatomists.”

“I’ll tell you. His name was Vesalius. And the only way he could get to know anatomy as he did, was by going to snatch bodies at night, from graveyards and places of execution.”

“Oh!” said Rosamond, with a look of disgust on her pretty face, “I am very glad you are not Vesalius. I should have thought he might find some less horrible way than that.”

“No, he couldn’t,” said Lydgate, going on too earnestly to take much notice of her answer. “He could only get a complete skeleton by snatching the whitened bones of a criminal from the gallows, and burying them, and fetching them away by bits secretly, in the dead of night.”

“I hope he is not one of your great heroes,” said Rosamond, half playfully, half anxiously, “else I shall have you getting up in the night to go to St. Peter’s churchyard. You know how angry you told me the people were about Mrs. Goby. You have enemies enough already.”

“So had Vesalius, Rosy. No wonder the medical fogies in Middlemarch are jealous, when some of the greatest doctors living were fierce upon Vesalius because they had believed in Galen, and he showed that Galen was wrong. They called him a liar and a poisonous monster. But the facts of the human frame were on his side; and so he got the better of them.”

“And what happened to him afterwards?” said Rosamond, with some interest.

“Oh, he had a good deal of fighting to the last. And they did exasperate him enough at one time to make him burn a good deal of his work. Then he got shipwrecked just as he was coming from Jerusalem to take a great chair at Padua. He died rather miserably.”

Source:  Middlemarch  Project Gutenberg eBook  Release date: July 1, 1994 [eBook #145] Most recently updated: April 12, 2026.  See Chapter 45.