Photo credit: WHO
Tuesday, August 12, 2025
Sunday, August 3, 2025
The Roots of “Reconciliation” in Canada, Or: A Reassessment of Hegel’s Canada
Much has been said of Hegel’s influence in Canada – maybe too much. Hegel’s philosophy is considered one of the reasons behind the landmark achievements of Canada’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which submitted its conclusions in 2015. So, it was no accident that a related book of philosophy followed in 2018, Hegel and Canada: Unity of Opposites?[1]
Taking titular inspiration from Patrick Anderson’s 1943 poem
“Dialectics”, Hegel and Canada evokes the legacy of that mighty trinity
of philosophers: Charles Taylor, Henry S. Harris, and Emil Fackenheim. It begins with a contribution by John
Burbidge, a student of Fackenheim, and what follows are the voices of other intellectual
companions. Hegel’s influence in Canada can be traced back to the end of the
nineteenth century, in particular to the philosopher John Watson (1847-1939),
long at Queen’s University in Kingston, Ontario, and who played an instrumental
role in the founding of the United Church of Canada.
Canadians ruminate at length about how a Scottish thinker,
Watson, ended up imprinting the nation with a Hegel-derived or dialectical approach
towards thinking. Did it have something
to do with murky German Romanticism resonating inside our once pristine
Canadian forests? Was it a Scottish
reading of Hegel that crossed the Atlantic and colonized our minds? In my view, it was none of the above.
I would like to argue here that Hegel already suited the
Canadian way of thinking because we, as Canadians, were predisposed to the idea
of “reconciliation”, well in advance of Hegel (1770 – 1831) and any “unity of
opposites”. There were two rich
historical sources to Canadian “reconciliation” – one known by a different name,
the other not so well known. The first
was the American War of Independence, and if we look at Thomas Paine’s widely-read
revolutionary polemic Common Sense (1776), we see that he presented the
American colonists at the time with two stark choices: “Reconciliation or
Independance[sic]”.[2] Thus, it was the United Empire Loyalists, faithful
to the British Crown, who found a new home in Canada, mostly around the Toronto
area: in other words, they had
“reconciled” themselves to the Crown.
A similar event occurred more than a century prior to the
American revolution. It was in the aftermath of the mid-seventeenth century English Civil Wars and
the short-lived republican commonwealth under Oliver Cromwell. I am speaking of the royal charter by King
Charles II which launched the Hudson’s Bay Company In 1670, just ten years
after the Stuart Restoration which brought the son of King Charles I
(who was executed by axe) to the throne of England. It speaks volumes that the largest land grant
in global history, made by a King who still espoused divine right, served as a foundation for Canada, thus establishing trading posts in Winnipeg,
Calgary, Edmonton, Victoria and many other places. In other words, the Hudson’s Bay Company was
formed (and so was Canada) after England had “reconciled” to the idea of itself
as a Kingdom – not to a fleeting republican “experiment” under Cromwell.
This suggests that the United Empire Loyalists were
following in the footsteps of the HBC’s traders and explorers. Who knows what would have happened to Canada
if this earlier “reconciliation” had not occurred in the first place. It is also interesting to note that today,
while the ‘HBC’ faded from commercial history into bankruptcy, discomfitted Canadians were at
the same time engaged in “reconciliation” with yet another King from England
(Charles III), who read the speech from the throne from Ottawa on 27 May 2025 in
the face of new threats to our sovereignty from Donald Trump.
It is important to appreciate that Canada’s creation (via
the Hudson’s Bay Company) was a royal act.
And that it occurred when the spirit of “reconciliation” remained high
in England. This was neither a Cromwellian/republican inspiration nor a product
of the following Glorious Revolution (1688/89), which limited the monarchy and
established the supremacy of Parliament.
This also reinforces my earlier writings elsewhere indicating that
Locke’s thought played a limited role in Canada, unlike in the USA.
I would also like to suggest – and here I borrow from Louis
B. Hartz’s famous thesis – that the founding of the Hudson’s Bay Company
represented the Stuart Restoration in Canada but one frozen in time. “For when
a part of a European nation is detached from the whole of it, and hurled
outward onto new soil, it loses the stimulus towards change that the whole
provides. It lapses into a kind of
immobility.”[3]
This is the reason why there is Puritanism in the USA, but no longer any in
England; why Ontario was considered more Scottish than Scotland[4];
and why the City of Victoria, British Columbia, remains a fossil.
I am suggesting here that the leap from “reconciliation” to
a Hegelian unity – or synthesis – of opposites was prepared by a distinctly Canadian
predisposition for the Crown. We see it
in the Hudson’s Bay Company, and we see it in the United Empire Loyalists who
followed in its footsteps. We also see
it in that Canadian neologism about which I have written elsewhere: “winning by
acclamation” – that most modest of Canadian sayings. In the United States if one wins an election
unopposed, one wins an election unopposed.
If this happens in Canada, you are “acclaimed”. To suggest as much is to imply deference to
the elected – and possibly, as well, to give a nod to divine authority
so-called, in other words, the Crown.[5]
Just look to the motto of the Globe and Mail (“Canada’s National Newspaper”) as
attributed to Junius: “The subject who is truly loyal to the Chief Magistrate
will neither advise nor submit to arbitrary measures.” The first word “subject”, followed by “truly
loyal” and “the Chief Magistrate” are rooted in the experience of the United
Empire Loyalists and drown out George Brown’s (founder of The Globe) liberal
“neither/nor” phraseology. It is because
Americans see themselves as “citizens” that the idea of “acclamation” is not
commonplace there. It is because
Canadians still see themselves as “subjects” that the idea of “acclamation” is
commonplace here.
Of course, liberalism and reconciliation can be complementary, despite the latter’s royalist connotations, and Canada’s Hegel culture was at its apex here when Lester Pearson was Prime Minister playing Canada’s role as the “middle power” in the era of the Cold War. Anyone interested in Hegel and the “middle” should look to Emile Fackenheim, especially his Religious Dimensions in Hegel’s Thought (1967). But Hegel, a notoriously difficult thinker, could not have anticipated our Nobel-prize winning Prime Minister, nor the generous number of Canadian fellow philosophers. Upon observing the activity and retro-activity of nineteenth-century Europe, in particular France since the Revolution of 1789, Hegel sought unity in mutual understanding, and Canadians found him in our search for reconciliation.[6]
I suspect Hegel’s work is to Canada what
Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations (1776), or Locke’s Two Treatises of
Government (written 1680-1683) were to the USA, and maybe what Marx’s Communist
Manifesto (1848) was to China – not comparable revolutionary texts by any means, but a reciprocal philosophy which found attraction here in a desire to
reconcile with the Crown.
[1]
Susan M. Dodd and Neil G. Robertson, eds., Hegel and Canada: Unity of
Opposites (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2018).
[2]
Thomas Paine, Common Sense and The American Crisis I,
intro. By Richard Beeman (New York: Penguin, 2015), p. 66.
[3]
Louis Hartz, The Founding of New Societies: Studies in the History of the
United States, Latin America, South Africa, Canada, and Australia (New
York: Harvest/HBJ, 1964), p. 3.
[4]
David MacGregor, “Canada’s Hegel: Our nation of compromise”, Literary Review
of Canada (Feb 1994), accessed online.
[5]
Joseph Canning, A History of Medieval Political Thought, 300-1450 (New
York: Routledge, 2005), p. 9.
[6] See Joachim Ritter, Hegel and the French Revolution: Essays on the Philosophy of Right, tr. Richard Dien Winfield (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1982).
Sunday, July 27, 2025
Genocide – A Definition: Raphael Lemkin in his own words
New conceptions require new terms. By “genocide” we mean the destruction of a nation or an ethnic group. This new word, coined by the author to denote an old practice in its modern development, is made from the ancient Greek word genos (race, tribe) and the Latin cide (killing), thus corresponding in its formation to such words as tyrannicide, homicide, infanticide, etc. Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except when accomplished by mass killings of all members of a nation. It is intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. The objectives of such a plan would be disintegration of the political and social institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups, and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity and even the lives of individuals belonging to such groups. Genocide is directed against the national group as an entity, and the actions involved are directed against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of a national group.
The following illustration will suffice. The confiscation of property of nationals of
an occupied area on the ground that they have left the country may be
considered simply as a deprivation of their individual property rights. However, if the confiscations are ordered
against individuals solely because they are Pole, Jews, or Czechs, then the
same confiscations tend in effect to weaken the national entities of which
these persons are members.
Genocide has two phases: one, destruction of the national
pattern of the oppressed group; the other, the imposition of the national
pattern of the oppressor. This
imposition, in turn, may be made upon the oppressed population which is allowed
to remain, or upon the territory alone, after removal of the population and the
colonization of the area by the oppressor’s own nationals. Denationalization was the word used in the
past to describe the destruction of a national patter. The author believes, however, that this word
is inadequate because: (1) it does not connote the destruction of the
biological structure; (2) in connoting the destruction of one national patter,
it does not connote the imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor;
and (3) denationalization is used by some authors to mean only deprivation of
citizenship.[1]
Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (1944)
[1] Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress, 2nd edition (Clark, New Jersey: The Lawbook Exchange Ltd., 2008), pp. 79, 80. Note: Lemkin adds that genocide can also be carried out by “Racial Discrimination in Feeding.” (See p. 87).
Saturday, July 5, 2025
The Law is King: Paine
But where says some is the King of America? I’ll tell you friend, he reigns above, and doth not make havoc of mankind like the Royal Brute of Britain. Yet that we appear to be defective even in earthly honors, let a day be solemnly set apart for proclaiming the charter [Magna Carta]; let it be brought forth placed on the divine law, the word of God; let a crown be placed thereon, by which the world may know, that so far as we approve of monarchy, that in America THE LAW IS KING. For as in absolute governments the king is law, so in free countries the law ought to be King; and there ought to be no other. But lest any ill use should afterwards arise, let the crown at the conclusion of the ceremony be demolished, and scattered among the people whose right it is.[1]
Thomas Paine, Common Sense (1776)
[1] Thomas Paine, Common Sense and The American Crisis I, Intro. by Richard Beeman (New York: Penguin, 2015), p. 45.
Friday, July 4, 2025
On Bullying, Cruelty and Wars
Bullying, whether flagrant or discreet, is a very prominent strand in social interaction: the nasty end of the endless human endeavour to get other people to behave as we would wish. We may like to think that we ourselves bully only on behalf of higher values (sharpening the exercise of the mind, deepening the awareness of God in the spiritually resistant, winning an argument or a struggle in which we are confident that right is firmly on our side). But those who can bully with any proficiency (those who are not irretrievably feeble) are apt to bully largely out of habit. We may like to think that we, at any rate, are cruel mainly to avoid worse outcomes: that only the compulsively cruel – the genuinely depraved – are cruel for the sake of being so. But cruelty has a constant tendency to get out of hand. In the areas of human practice where the capacity for cruelty is most directly engaged – in policing, in imprisonment, above all in warfare – the control of cruelty (even the control of murderousness) is always pretty insecure. In such a milieu there will always be many who go too far, whose actions vastly exceed any possible justification, even when the practices themselves are relatively easy to justify. There cannot be armies or police forces or gaols without cruelty. (This is a matter better treated by Augustine a millennium and a half ago than by any subsequent author …) Least of all there cannot be wars without cruelty. But there are very good reasons (and more than sufficient causes) why armies and police forces and even gaols and wars are still with us today.[1]
John Dunn, The Cunning of Unreason (2000)
[1]
John Dunn, The Cunning of Unreason: Making Sense of Politics (London:
Basic Books, 2000), p. 60. John Dunn’s
extraordinary words here are not limited to this short excerpt. Please see his following paragraphs as they appear in his
book.
Tuesday, July 1, 2025
From Goya to Gaza: The Disasters of War
Francisco Goya, Yo lo vi (I saw it), Plate 44 from "The Disasters of War", 1810/Alamy.
In all, there are 80 “Disasters of War” prints by Goya, with
all but one illustrating suffering, the consequences of famine, or a serious number of atrocities stemming from Napoleon’s war with Spain (1808-1814). They were not published until 1863, 35 years
after Goya had died.
Why the West is different from Russia and China: ‘stages’ of development
For an explanation as to why the West is different from Russia and China, look no further than the Renaissance, which neither Russia nor China experienced. The West underwent at least three significant ‘stages’ of development that were absent elsewhere: artistic, scientific and political “experimentation”. It all began with the Renaissance.
Developments nearly contemporaneous to Renaissance-era-figures
like Leonardo and Michelangelo can be found in Russia’s “Ivan the Terrible” and
China’s “Forbidden City” – examples more inclined to intimidate than encourage
searching curiosity. The Renaissance was
more than a “re-birth” of classical humanism and individualism. It represented - in the truest sense of the
word – artistic “experimentation”.[1]
Look to Leonardo who is remembered today for his art, but his notebooks observe
everything from hydraulics to astronomy.[2]
This spirit of free enquiry was then translated from the artistic
world into empirical research, notably by figures such as Galileo, resulting in
scientific “experimentation”. His famous Leaning Tower of Pisa experiment,
which determined that different objects fall at the same rate of acceleration, a
story which every child knows, was central to introducing the world to the
Scientific Revolution. Essential to it was the study of planetary orbits, which gave rise to the understanding of a heliocentric universe.
The results of the Scientific Revolution then came to be
associated with political “experimentation”.
We see it first in Machiavelli’s, The Prince (1513), but it is
more notable in England during the 17th century. The English Civil Wars were, in effect, a break
from the existing political mould, and they ended up putting King Charles I on
the scaffold in 1649. England wanted to
‘test’ something new, so its King was put on ‘trial’. Soon afterwards Oliver Cromwell alongside his republican commonwealth was considered
the way out, albeit temporarily.
There was a fourth exploratory dimension, in addition to the
artistic, scientific, and political manifestations: religious
“experimentation”. We see this in Luther
and Calvin and in the Protestant Reformation in general, where the Gutenberg
Bible (translated in the vernacular) gave every man the apparent authority to
make decisions on his own and no longer rely on the parish priest. Catholic unity gave way to Protestant disunity.
I would also like to suggest that the Reformation, an early
form of populism, was in some ways comparable to today’s populism, which is not
confined to the West. The trouble with
today’s expression of populism is that it is fundamentally science-denying, and
while the Gutenberg Bible of yesterday can be compared to the cellphone of
today, current populism does not acknowledge the authority of science invested
in the ubiquitous cellphone. This underlying lack of curiosity about something so everyday is a step away
from the Renaissance ideal of “experimentation”. The West, in other words, given Donald Trump’s
second term of office as president, is now closer to copying modes of thought
from Russia and China than ever before.
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