David Hume - and the Right of Resistance: Canadian Implications of the Arab Spring

David Hume (1711-1769) was a Scottish Enlightenment philosopher, quite possibly the most distinguished political and moral thinker Britain has ever produced.  Not unlike Montaigne, he was a moderate and a skeptic, opposed to dogmatism; and in one of his essays he explains, “the middle station of life is more favourable to happiness, as well as to virtue and wisdom: but as the arguments that prove this seem pretty obvious, I shall here forbear insisting on them.”[i]

Of particular interest here is the lengthy quotation below derived from Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature, published when the author was only 26.  It speaks to the “right of resistance” of any number of today’s Arab nations – not just oil-laden Libya.

However, Hume also raises the possibility that a magistrate can at times be “beneficial to the public” - and at other times he can also be “pernicious and tyrannical.”  The clearest case of recent tyranny in Canada was during the G20 Summit in Toronto, when over 1000 citizens were locked up in makeshift pens over two nights - and many others were brutalized, including journalists.  Perhaps “prudence” should tell me to keep silent, but Toronto in the summer of 2010 was not the Canada where I grew up.  (See my A Response to the Prime Minister's Christmas Message.)

 

Under Harper’s government, Canadians have moved from adhering to principles articulated by the United Nations to kow-towing instead before the G20 and, along with it, obeying a particular theory of economics that thrives during (or is the cause of) great recessions, if we look to Naomi Klein’s argument in The Shock Doctrine.  Absent today is any notion of “public fairness”, if we consider Harper’s elimination of the voter subsidy; missing, as well, is any sense of a “public process” when we look at Harper’s lack of respect for the “collective bargaining” of postal workers.  “Freedom of association” is under threat in Canada because the Harper government eyes “freedom” only in terms of the “individual,” misguided by a notion of “the survival of the fittest”.

While Stephen Harper thinks in terms of “neo”- economics, he hides its relationship with the Evolutionary Theory (and Game Theory). But he is no constitutional expert (as we know from his prorogued parliaments).  It would appear that the prime minister has skimmed a Reader’s Digest version of Canadian constitutional law (while probably skipping its history), which is why he thinks a majority government has the legitimacy to change unilaterally our Constitution (that is, via the Senate, and hence: everything else). In his mind, attempting to alter fundamentally the Constitution is no different from lowering corporate taxes; so long as he has the much-vaunted majority, he can do anything, and besides, it has been part of the Reform agenda for years; nothing “hidden” here. Anything can be justified so long as it is posted somewhere in the Conservative playbook.

 

But if we return to Hume and the “small-l” liberal question regarding the limits to any one government’s powers we are reminded that “every part or member of the constitution must have a right of self-defence, and of maintaining its ancient bounds against the encroachment of every other authority.”  In other words Canada’s Senators  (even the ones now appointed by Harper) likely have a collective right, if not a duty, to defend the Constitution, regardless of what Pamela Wallin or Marjory LeBreton say, as their experiences  are far from having been deepened by constitutional law (which is very unBurkean of these Conservatives).  Similarly Quebec and Ontario, among other provinces, have a right to resist, or does Harper no longer think of Canada as belonging to a Confederation?

For the textual details of Hume, please read the following, and remember that the “right of resistance” is not confined to the Arab Spring alone; it has Canadian implications too:

But here an English reader will be apt to enquire concerning that famous revolution, which has had such a happy influence on our constitution, and has been attended with such mighty consequences.  We have already remark’d, that in the case of enormous tyranny and oppression, ‘’tis lawful to take arms even against supreme power; and that as government is a mere human intervention for mutual advantage and security, it no longer imposes any obligation, either natural or moral, when it ceases to have that tendency.  But tho’ this general principle be authoriz’d by common sense, and the practice of all ages, ‘tis certainly impossible for the laws, or even for philosophy, to establish any particular rules, by which we may know when resistance is lawful; and decide all controversies, which may arise on that subject.  This may not only happen with regard to supreme power; but ‘tis possible, even in some constitutions, where the legislative assembly is not log’d in one person, that there may be a magistrate so eminent and powerful, as to oblige the laws to keep silence in this particular.  Nor wou’d this silence be an effect only of their respect, but also of their prudence; since ‘tis certain, that in the vast variety of circumstances, which occur in all governments, an exercise of power, in so great a magistrate, may at one time be beneficial to the public, when at another time wou’d be pernicious and tyrannical.  But not withstanding this silence of the laws in limited monarchies, ‘tis certain, that people still retain the right of resistance; since ‘tis impossible, even in the most despotic governments, to deprive them of it.  The same necessity of self-preservation, and the same motive of public good, give them the same liberty in the one case as in the other.  And we may farther observe, that in such mix’d governments, the cases, wherein resistance is lawful, much occur much oftener, and greater indulgence be given to the subjects to defend themselves by force of arms, than in arbitrary governments.  Not only where the chief magistrate enters into measures, in themselves, extremely pernicious to the public, but even when he wou’d encroach on the other parts of the constitution, and extend his powers beyond the legal bounds, it is allowable to resist and dethrone him; tho’ such resistance and violence may, in the general tenor of the laws, be deemed unlawful and rebellious.  For besides that nothing is more essential to the public interest, than the preservation of public liberty; ‘tis evident, that if such a mix’d government be once suppos’d to be established, every part or member of the constitution must have a right of self-defence, and of maintaining its ancient bounds against the encroachment of every other authority.  As matter wou’d have been created in vain, were it depriv’d of a power of resistance, without which no part of it cou’d preserve a distinct existence, and the whole might be crowded up into a single point: So ‘tis a gross absurdity to suppose, in any government, a right without a remedy, or allow, that the supreme power is share’d with the people, without allowing, ‘that tis lawful for them to defend their share against every invader.  Those, therefore, who wou’d seem to respect our free government, and yet deny the right of resistance, have renounc’d all pretensions to common sense, and do not merit a serious answer.[ii]

---

[i] David Hume, Selected Essays.  (World Classics), ed. Stephen Copley and Andrew Edgar (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1993),  p. 9.

[ii] David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. Ernest Mossner (Toronto: Penguin, 1985), pp. 614,615.